Uncontrolled Resource Consumption

Summary

The Avro array and map decoders looped over an attacker-controlled block-count value without checking the underlying reader's error state inside the loop body. Reader.ReadBlockHeader returns the count as a Go int, which is 64-bit on amd64 / arm64 targets -- so a producer can declare a block of up to math.MaxInt64 (~9.2 x 1018) elements followed by EOF (or any truncated payload), and the decoder will attempt that many no-op iterations before propagating the error. The realistic ceiling is "indefinite until the worker is killed externally" -- a single hostile payload pins a CPU core until the process is OOM-killed, deadline-cancelled, or terminated. Remote, unauthenticated denial-of-service. The fix exits the loop on the first inner-decode error. It does not bound the loop length itself; for full coverage on untrusted inputs, also configure Config.MaxSliceAllocSize and Config.MaxMapAllocSize (the latter introduced in v2.33.0).