Inconsistent Interpretation of HTTP Requests ('HTTP Request/Response Smuggling')
CVE-2026-42581
Summary
Netty is an asynchronous, event-driven network application framework. In versions prior to 4.1.133.Final and 4.2.x prior to 4.2.13.Final, `HttpObjectDecoder` strips a conflicting Content-Length header when a request carries both Transfer-Encoding: chunked and Content-Length, but only for HTTP/1.1 messages. The guard is absent for HTTP/1.0. An attacker that sends an HTTP/1.0 request with both headers causes Netty to decode the body as chunked while leaving Content-Length intact in the forwarded `HttpMessage`. Any downstream proxy or handler that trusts Content-Length over Transfer-Encoding will disagree on message boundaries, enabling request smuggling. This vulnerability is fixed in 4.2.13.Final and 4.1.133.Final.
- LOW
- NETWORK
- HIGH
- UNCHANGED
- NONE
- NONE
- HIGH
- HIGH
CWE-444 - HTTP Request Smuggling
Entities such as web servers, web caching proxies, and application firewalls could parse HTTP requests differently. When there are two or more such entities in the path of an HTTP request, an attacker can send a specially crafted HTTP request that is seen as two different sets of requests by the attacked devices, allowing the attacker to smuggle a request into one device without the other device being aware of it. Such a vulnerability can prove devastating, for it enables further attacks on the application, like web cache poisoning, session hijacking, cross-site scripting, security bypassing, and sensitive information exposure.
References
Advisory Timeline
- Published