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Improper Certificate Validation in org.apache.logging.log4j:log4j-core

CVE-2025-68161

  • org.apache.logging.log4j:log4j-core
Medium
6.3/10

Summary

The Socket Appender in Apache Log4j Core versions 2.0-beta9 through 2.25.2 does not perform TLS hostname verification of the peer certificate, even when the "verifyHostName" https://logging.apache.org/log4j/2.x/manual/appenders/network.html#SslConfiguration-attr-verifyHostName configuration attribute or the "log4j2.sslVerifyHostName" https://logging.apache.org/log4j/2.x/manual/systemproperties.html#log4j2.sslVerifyHostName system property is set to true. This issue may allow a Man-In-The-Middle attacker to intercept or redirect log traffic under the following conditions. The attacker is able to intercept or redirect network traffic between the client and the log receiver. The attacker can present a server certificate issued by a certification authority trusted by the Socket Appenders configured trust store (or by the default Java trust store if no custom trust store is configured). Users are advised to upgrade to Apache Log4j Core version 2.25.3, which addresses this issue. As an alternative mitigation, the Socket Appender may be configured to use a private or restricted trust root to limit the set of trusted certificates.

  • HIGH
  • NETWORK
  • LOW
  • UNCHANGED
  • NONE
  • NONE
  • LOW
  • NONE

CWE-295 - Improper Certificate Validation

The authenticity component of a web system stems from the ability to validate “Digital certificates”, which (i) establish trust between two or more entities sharing data over a network; (ii) ensure data at rest and transit is secure from unauthorized access; and (iii) check the identity of the actors that interact with the system. An application with absent or ineffective certificate validation mechanisms allows malicious users, impersonating trusted hosts, to manipulate the communication path between the client and the host, resulting in unauthorized access to data and to the application’s internal environment, and potentially enabling man-in-the-middle attacks.

References

Advisory Timeline

  • Published